Voter model on the adaptive SBM
In January 2016, Laurent Hébert-Dufrense, Antoine Allard, Pierre-André Noël, Eric Libby and I got together for a SFI working group, to investigate competitor dynamics on networks. Our starting point was the connection between voter models and the Moran process, and, more generally, questions about the political arena and biology. Our results are now available in a Scientific Reports paper titled “Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks”.
In the paper, we introduce a voter model on the adaptive SBM—the structure of the network changes depending on who’s claiming what resource. It turns out that the model can be mapped to a well-known evolutionary game theory problem. The upshot? This gives us a game-theoretical perspective on network structure. In turn, this allows us to conclude that, for example, sustaining echo chambers is not a robust and viable strategy. So instead of fostering closed communities, strive for open discourse —across boundaries.
Check out this Phys.org article for a popular summary.